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Directive Principles versus Fundamental Rights, and the Fundamental Duties

Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties · Part 2 / 2 · Fact-checked on 19 October 2026 · how we check

Written with AI from the sources listed at the bottom of this page, then fact-checked by a separate AI.

How the Directive Principles differ from the Fundamental Rights, the chain of cases and amendments from Champakam to Minerva Mills and Article 31C, the 2024 ruling on Article 39(b), and the eleven Fundamental Duties of Article 51A: origin, content and enforcement.

Part 1 of this chapter set out what the Directive Principles of State Policy ask of the State and how laws have carried them out. This part takes up two questions that Prelims asks again and again. First, what happens when a Directive Principle and one of the Fundamental Rights pull in opposite directions? Second, what are the Fundamental Duties in Part IVA, where did they come from and how far can they be enforced? The part closes with a side-by-side comparison of rights, principles and duties.

The two Parts were written as partners, but they work with different tools. Fundamental Rights are justiciable: a person whose right is violated can move the Supreme Court under Article 32 or a High Court under Article 226, and Article 13 makes a law that takes away or abridges a right void to that extent. Directive Principles of State Policy are non-justiciable under Article 37: no court can order the State to carry one out, and no law can be struck down merely because it ignores one. Many rights are negative in form, telling the State what it must not do, while the principles are positive, telling it what to aim for. Suppose a State bans a newspaper without reason: the editor can have the ban quashed. Suppose the same State provides no work to the unemployed, as Article 41 asks: no court can compel it.

The first clash came within a year. The Madras government had divided seats in its medical and engineering colleges among communities by a government order. In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) the Supreme Court struck the order down as a breach of Article 29(2), which forbids denying admission to a State-maintained institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. The Court said the Directive Principles cannot override the Fundamental Rights; they must conform to them and run as subsidiary to them. Parliament replied with the First Amendment (1951), which inserted Article 15(4), permitting special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes and for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The same Amendment added Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule to protect land reform laws, passed to carry out Article 39, from challenge as violations of Fundamental Rights.

The balance shifted in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), where eleven judges, by six to five, held that Parliament could not amend the Constitution to take away or abridge a Fundamental Right. Since many welfare measures depended on exactly such amendments, the ruling seemed to block the road to the principles. Parliament responded in 1971. The 24th Amendment declared that Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution, Part III included. The 25th Amendment inserted Article 31C: a law giving effect to the principles in Article 39(b) or (c) could not be held void for being inconsistent with Article 14, 19 or 31, and no court could question a law's declaration that it was made to give effect to that policy. For the first time two Directive Principles were placed above Fundamental Rights. Article 39(b) concerns sharing the community's material resources for the common good, and Article 39(c) preventing wealth from concentrating harmfully.

In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) the Court upheld the 24th Amendment and overruled Golaknath, but held that the amending power cannot be used to destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. On Article 31C it treated the provision as two halves. The first half, shielding laws for Article 39(b) and (c) from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31, was upheld. The second half, which made the legislature's own declaration final and shut out the courts, was struck down: it would have let a legislature certify its own law and so remove judicial review. In practice this means that when a law claims the protection of Article 31C, a court can still examine whether the law really gives effect to the principles in Article 39(b) or (c). The right to property in Article 31 was later removed from Part III by the 44th Amendment (1978), so Article 31C today protects such laws against Articles 14 and 19.

The 42nd Amendment (1976) went much further. It rewrote Article 31C so that a law giving effect to any or all of the principles in Part IV, not only Article 39(b) and (c), would be safe from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31. In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) the Supreme Court struck this extension down. The Court reasoned that the Constitution rests on a balance between Part III and Part IV: the goals of Part IV are to be reached by the means Part III permits, not by discarding those means. Giving every principle an overriding status would wipe out the protection of Articles 14 and 19 for a vast range of laws, and the harmony and balance between rights and principles is itself a basic feature. The result is that Article 31C survives in the form approved in Kesavananda, covering only Article 39(b) and (c).

The meaning of Article 39(b) came back before the Court in Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, decided by a bench of nine judges on 5 November 2024. The case arose from a Maharashtra housing law that let the State acquire old, unsafe buildings in Mumbai for repair and reconstruction. The question was whether every privately owned resource counts as a 'material resource of the community'. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer had taken that wide view in a 1977 opinion, and later decisions had leaned on it. The majority rejected the wide view: owning something privately does not by itself make it a resource of the community, though a particular private resource may qualify, depending on factors such as the nature of the resource, its scarcity, its effect on the well-being of the community and how far it is concentrated in private hands. The bench also held that Article 31C, as upheld in Kesavananda, remains in force.

The original Constitution listed rights but no duties. In 1976, during the Emergency, the Congress party set up a committee under Sardar Swaran Singh, which recommended a chapter on the duties of citizens. The 42nd Amendment (1976) acted on the idea by inserting Part IVA, a single Article, 51A, listing ten Fundamental Duties. The committee had proposed eight; Parliament adopted ten and did not accept its suggestion that failure to follow them could be punished. The idea of placing duties beside rights in a constitution is usually traced to the constitution of the former USSR. The 86th Amendment (2002) added an eleventh duty, clause (k), in the same Act that made education a Fundamental Right under Article 21A: a parent or guardian is to provide opportunities for education to his child or ward between six and fourteen years of age.

Article 51A opens with the words 'It shall be the duty of every citizen of India', and its eleven clauses are easier to hold in groups. Four concern the nation: respect for the Constitution, the National Flag and the National Anthem (a), the noble ideals of the freedom struggle (b), the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India (c), and defending the country and rendering national service when called upon (d). Two concern society: common brotherhood across religious, linguistic and regional or sectional divides, with the renunciation of practices derogatory to the dignity of women (e), and the rich heritage of the composite culture (f). Two concern nature and public life: protecting the natural environment with compassion for living creatures (g), and safeguarding public property and abjuring violence (i). Two concern mind and effort: the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform (h), and excellence in all spheres (j). The last, (k), is the education duty of a parent or guardian, so every citizen carries ten duties and parents one more. The table below gives each clause.

Like the principles, the duties are non-justiciable: the Constitution attaches no penalty to them, and no court can be asked to enforce one directly. And while several Fundamental Rights protect every person, foreigners included, the duties bind citizens only. They are not empty, though, because ordinary laws back several of them. The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 punishes insults to the National Flag and the Constitution and the prevention of the singing of the National Anthem; the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 protect wild life and forests; and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 carries out the right to which clause (k) is the counterpart. A committee chaired by Justice J.S. Verma (1999) identified such existing laws and suggested how the duties could be taught and made better known. Courts also refer to the duties when judging whether a restriction on a right is reasonable, since a law that helps citizens perform a duty is likely to serve a legitimate public purpose.

Taken together, the three Parts describe the whole bargain between a citizen and the State. Part III limits the State and can be enforced in court; Part IV directs the State and is carried out through laws, budgets and the verdict of voters; Part IVA asks the citizen to do his share and is enforced only where a law says so. The history of the clash between the first two reads as a chain: Champakam (principles subordinate), the First Amendment (rights amended), Golaknath (rights beyond amendment), the 24th and 25th Amendments and Article 31C (two principles given priority), Kesavananda (basic structure; Article 31C partly upheld), the 42nd Amendment (all principles given priority) and Minerva Mills (balance restored). The 2024 ruling on Article 39(b) shows that the meaning of the Directive Principles of State Policy is still being worked out. The table below sets Fundamental Rights, principles and Fundamental Duties side by side.

Exam traps

• Champakam Dorairajan (1951) held that the Directive Principles must conform to and run subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights; the reply was Article 15(4), added by the First Amendment, not Article 15(5).
• Golaknath (1967) was decided by eleven judges, six to five; Kesavananda Bharati (1973) by thirteen judges, seven to six. Do not swap the benches.
• Article 31C was inserted by the 25th Amendment (1971); the 42nd Amendment (1976) only extended it to all the Directive Principles.
• Kesavananda upheld the first half of Article 31C and struck down only the second half, which barred courts from questioning the legislature's declaration.
• Minerva Mills (1980) struck down the 42nd Amendment's extension of Article 31C; the provision survives only for Article 39(b) and (c). Harmony between Parts III and IV is a basic feature.
• The Swaran Singh Committee suggested eight duties; the 42nd Amendment added ten; the 86th Amendment (2002) added the eleventh, clause (k). There are eleven duties, not ten.
• Fundamental Duties bind citizens only and carry no penalty in the Constitution; laws such as the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 give some of them teeth (that Act is older than Part IVA).
• Directive Principles are traced to the Irish Constitution and Fundamental Duties to the former USSR; voting and paying taxes are not among the eleven duties.

Recap

• Rights are justiciable (Articles 32, 226; Article 13 voids conflicting laws); principles are non-justiciable (Article 37) and need laws to take effect.
• Champakam (1951): principles subordinate to rights; First Amendment (1951): Article 15(4), Articles 31A, 31B and the Ninth Schedule.
• Golaknath (1967, 6:5): Parliament cannot abridge Fundamental Rights; 24th Amendment (1971) restored the power.
• 25th Amendment (1971): Article 31C protects laws for Article 39(b) and (c) against Articles 14, 19 and 31.
• Kesavananda (1973): basic structure; first half of Article 31C upheld, bar on judicial review struck down.
• 42nd Amendment extended Article 31C to all principles; Minerva Mills (1980) struck that down: balance of Parts III and IV is basic.
• Property Owners Association (2024, nine judges): not every private resource is a material resource of the community; Article 31C survives.
• Fundamental Duties: Part IVA, Article 51A; 42nd Amendment (1976) on the Swaran Singh Committee's advice; USSR model; eleventh duty by the 86th Amendment (2002).
• Duties bind citizens only, carry no constitutional penalty and are enforced through laws (Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971; environment laws; RTE Act, 2009); Justice J.S. Verma Committee (1999).

Practice questions

Sources

• Constitution of India: Articles 13, 14, 15(4), 19, 21A, 29(2), 31, 31A, 31B, 31C, 32, 37, 39, 41, 51A and 226; Ninth Schedule — https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india/
• Constitution (First, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, Forty-second, Forty-fourth and Eighty-sixth Amendment) Acts; Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971; Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — https://www.indiacode.nic.in
• Supreme Court of India: State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951); I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967); Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973); Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980); Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (2024) — https://digiscr.sci.gov.in
• Constituent Assembly Debates (Dr B.R. Ambedkar on the Directive Principles) — https://eparlib.nic.in
• Report of the Committee to Operationalise the Suggestions to Teach Fundamental Duties to the Citizens of the Country (Justice J.S. Verma), Ministry of Human Resource Development, 1999 — https://www.education.gov.in